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Neuroanatomical dissociations between recognition and 
  priming have typically been identified in amnesic patients, 
whereby damage to the hippocampus and surrounding medial 
temporal lobe (MTL) cortex disrupts recognition but not priming 
(Warrington and Weiskrantz, 1970; Shimamura, 1986; Hamann 
and Squire, 1997; Schacter and Buckner, 1998b; Squire, 2004). 
However, an alternative interpretation is that both recognition 
and priming rely on MTL structures, but that recognition is more 
sensitive to damage than priming (see Berry et al., 2008a,b). A 
“double-dissociation” (Teuber, 1955) between recognition and 
priming would be required to show that they rely on distinct 
brain structures, such that recognition would be disrupted by 
damage to structure A but not structure B and priming would be 
disrupted by damage to structure B but not A. Cortical damage 
has been shown to impair priming but not recognition (reviewed 
by Gabrieli, 1998), but recent studies have suggested a more com-
plex relationship between cortical damage and priming (e.g., 
Kroll et al., 2003) that undermines any clear double-dissociation 
between neural substrates of priming and recognition. Additional 
evidence is therefore needed to show conclusively that priming 
and recognition are neuroanatomically distinct (see also Kinder 
and Shanks, 2003).
IntroductIon
Priming and recognition are distinct behavioral expressions of 
memory that feature prominently in the human memory literature. 
Priming is generally defined as faster, more accurate, or otherwise 
facilitated responding in tests that measure memory implicitly, that 
is, without the subject’s awareness that memory is being tested 
(Roediger, 1990; Schacter and Buckner, 1998b; Wiggs and Martin, 
1998; Henson, 2003; Schacter et al., 2007). Recognition involves 
the discrimination between previously studied and novel informa-
tion, and is considered an explicit expression of memory, in that 
it generally involves conscious awareness that memory is being 
expressed and confidence in the decisions that are made (Tulving, 
1985; Yonelinas, 2001). Priming and recognition are widely thought 
to result from the operation of two distinct memory systems, an 
implicit memory system that supports priming and an explicit 
memory system that supports recognition (Gabrieli, 1998; Squire, 
2004). Nonetheless, the distinction between priming and recogni-
tion has been challenged based on work showing that a single-
process based on signal detection can account for priming and 
recognition (Berry et al., 2008a,b; see also Reder et al., 2009). The 
question that we address in the current study is whether processes 
that support priming also support recognition, and vice versa.
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Studies on healthy individuals have measured neural   correlates 
of either priming or of recognition, and different patterns of brain 
activity have been linked to one versus the other (Gabrieli, 1998; 
Schacter and Buckner, 1998a,b; Henson, 2003, 2005; Wagner et al., 
2005). Generally, superior prefrontal cortex, MTL, and parietal cor-
tex are associated with recognition, whereas occipitotemporal and 
inferior prefrontal cortex are associated with priming. However, 
results from only a handful of studies that attempted to contrast 
neural correlates of priming and recognition obtained under highly 
similar circumstances are relevant to the debate over whether these 
memory expressions are neurally dissociable (see Berry et al., 2008b; 
reviewed in Voss and Paller, 2008a). Some of these studies (Rugg 
et al., 1998; Paller et al., 2003; Henson et al., 2005; Schott et al., 
2005) compared neural measures obtained in circumstances when 
recognition was strong and accurate to neural measures obtained 
in circumstances when recognition was absent and behavioral 
evidence for priming was present (i.e., by focusing on recogni-
tion hits versus recognition misses when priming was operative). 
Dissociations were found between neural correlates of priming 
and recognition, and this was taken to indicate that priming and 
recognition rely on distinct neural substrates.
A limitation of the aforementioned neuroimaging evidence, 
discussed by Berry et al. (2008b), is that the behavioral effects for 
which neural correlates were obtained were not sufficient to dissoci-
ate priming from recognition. In fact, difficulties associated with 
separating implicit and explicit memory on behavioral grounds 
have long been appreciated (Richardson-Klavehn and Bjork, 1988). 
The neuroimaging studies attempted to isolate priming by examin-
ing it when subjects failed to give a correct recognition response. 
This strategy is tantamount to showing that a given experimental 
manipulation produces a greater effect on recognition than on 
priming; that is, priming was robust even when recognition was 
poor. Thus, a single memory retrieval process described by a signal-
detection model could have resulted in the observed behavioral 
dissociations if priming and recognition were to differ in the level of 
noise against which decisions were made (Berry et al., 2008b). The 
same could be true of the observed neural dissociations if neural 
correlates of priming and recognition also differed in the level of 
noise (Henson, 2006). If priming and recognition were to rely on 
independent brain processes, then it should be possible to identify 
experimental manipulations that produce opposite effects on prim-
ing, recognition, and their neural measures. We therefore sought to 
identify circumstances for which these conditions are met.
Zago et al. (2005) identified a counterintuitive relationship 
between the amount of time that an object is studied and the mag-
nitude of later priming for the object, measured as the speed of a 
category verification decision. The magnitude of priming increased 
as study duration increased from 20 to 250 ms, and declined as 
study duration further increased from 250 ms to approximately 
2 s. Two processes, “sharpening” and “selection,” were hypothesized 
to underlie this trend that are broadly consistent with previous 
mechanistic accounts of priming (Desimone, 1996; Wiggs and 
Martin, 1998). Consonant with the finding that the magnitude of 
behavioral priming was heavily influenced by study duration, Zago 
et al. (2005) identified a rise-and-fall pattern in the magnitude of 
repetition suppression of neural responses in priming-associated 
cortical regions including occipitotemporal and inferior prefrontal 
cortex. These neural findings are consistent with the interpretation 
that priming was positively related to study duration before 250 ms 
and inversely related to study duration after 250 ms.
In contrast, the accuracy of recognition improves roughly as a 
log-linear function as study time increases (Tversky and Sherman, 
1975; Loftus and Kallman, 1979), including on the brief time scale 
of 250 ms to 2 s (Ellis et al., 1977) used to study priming by Zago 
et al. (2005). We therefore reasoned that manipulating study dura-
tion for objects could exert opposite effects on priming and rec-
ognition. We had participants study objects either for 250 ms or 
2 s, and later measured both priming and recognition for each 
object during a memory test in which all objects were presented 
for identical durations (Figure 1). We hypothesized that priming 
would be greatest and recognition would be least for objects studied 
for 250 ms, whereas priming would be least and recognition would 
be greatest for objects studied for 2 s. Furthermore, we collected 
event-related brain potential (ERP) responses to objects in order 
to test for neural dissociations between priming and recognition
1. 
Based on previous findings (reviewed in Voss and Paller, 2008a), 
we hypothesized ERP correlates priming and recognition would 
dissociate based on the timing of the relevant neural processing, 
with earlier effects attributable to priming, as well as possibly in 
the location and/or directionality of the relevant neural process-
ing. This latter prediction is based on consistent findings showing 
reduced neural activity at posterior visual regions in association 
with priming, in contrast to greater neural activity at fronto-parietal 
regions in association with recognition (see also Gabrieli, 1998; 
Schacter et al., 2007).
MaterIals and Methods
Visual stimuli included 320 color digital photographs of com-
mon, nameable objects. Each image depicted a unique object. 
Approximately half were natural objects (e.g., an alligator, an 
orange, wheat), and half were manufactured objects (e.g., scissors, 
a chair, a balloon). Object images were displayed on a white back-
ground at the center of a computer monitor, and were sized to fit 
within a square subtending approximately 4° of visual angle.
During the study phase, subjects (N = 14, ages 18–24, 8 female, 
all right-handed) viewed 170 objects. Half of the objects were dis-
played for 250 ms (Brief) and half were displayed for 2,000 ms 
(Long). Objects assigned to the Brief and Long conditions were 
counterbalanced across subjects. A mask was displayed after each 
object, comprising a collection of distorted features of objects that 
were not in the main stimulus set (Figure 1). The mask was dis-
played for 2,250 ms following each Brief object and for 500 ms 
following each Long object, such that the total duration of each 
trial was 2,500 ms (note that different mask durations for the Brief 
and Long conditions could potentially have contributed to any 
observed behavioral or neural differences, although it seems reason-
able to attribute different effects to the manipulation of stimulus 
duration). The same mask was used throughout the entire experi-
ment. Subjects were required to categorize each object as natural 
1It should be noted that this paradigm is suitable for assessing relationships betwe-
en priming and recognition in the visual modality, but that other methods would 
be needed to answer similar questions with respect to priming in other sensory 
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(old Brief, 85 objects), those presented for 2,000 ms during the study 
phase (old Long, 85 objects), and those that were not presented 
during the study phase (new, 150 objects). Subjects were required to 
make two button-press responses to each object. The first response 
was the natural/manufactured categorization response used dur-
ing the study phase, and this response was   registered as soon as 
possible after the object was displayed. Speed for this response 
was heavily emphasized. To compute accuracy for this subjective 
response, each object was characterized as natural or manufac-
tured based on the majority response for all subjects during the 
test phase. The second response was a recognition decision crossed 
with a confidence rating. Subjects pressed one of four buttons to 
indicate that the object was old with high confidence, old with low 
confidence, new with low confidence, or new with high confidence. 
This response was made after a prompt was displayed, and accuracy 
was emphasized over speed. All objects were presented for 500 ms, 
followed by the mask used during the study phase for 2,000 ms. 
Immediately following the mask, the recognition prompt (the let-
ter “R” for “respond”) was displayed for 2,000 ms. A 500-ms break 
separated the recognition prompt from the next trial. Trial order 
was randomized.
EEG was sampled continuously during the test phase from 64 
scalp locations conforming to the extended International 10-20 
positioning system (Chatrian et al., 1988) using a BioSemi Active 
II system (BioSemi Instrumentation, Amsterdam). Recordings 
were also made from left and right mastoids, and four additional 
channels were used to monitor horizontal and vertical eye move-
ments. EEG was digitized at a rate of 1,024 Hz with a bandpass of 
0.01–120 Hz. Recordings were made with the standard Biosemi 
reference (CMS-DRL), and rereferenced offline to averaged mas-
toids in order to facilitate comparisons with previous studies of 
ERP correlates of recognition memory, which frequently use this 
reference. ERPs timelocked to the onset of the visual object stimulus 
(not the recognition prompts) were calculated for each condition 
of interest in 1,000 ms epochs, beginning 100 ms prior to stimu-
lus onset. Epochs contaminated by artifacts were discarded (9% 
on average) leaving a final average trial count of 76, 79, and 138 
for the Brief, Long, and New conditions, respectively. Data from 
three additional subjects were excluded due to excessive artifacts 
(>25% of epochs contaminated). ERPs were averaged over latency 
intervals and electrode clusters for statistical assessment. Six clus-
ters included anterior, central, and posterior electrodes for both 
hemispheres (Anterior left: Fp1, AF3, AF7, F1, F3, F5, F7; ante-
rior right: Fp2, AF4, AF8, F2, F4, F6, F8; central left: FC1, FC3, 
FC5, C1, C3, C5, CP1, CP3, CP5; central right: FC2, FC4, FC6, 
C2, C4, C6, CP2, CP4, CP6; posterior left: P1, P3, P5, P7, P9, PO3, 
PO7, O1; posterior right: P2, P4, P6, P8, P10, PO4, PO8, O2), such 
that statistical analyses would transparently capture laterality and 
anterior–posterior distributional differences between conditions. 
Repeated-measures ANOVAs incorporated Geisser–Greenhouse 
correction when appropriate. ERP data quality was assessed by 
computing the signal-to-noise ratios (SNR) for each subject and 
condition, with signal defined as the maximum (unsigned) ERP 
value after stimulus onset and noise as the standard deviation of val-
ues during the pre-stimulus interval (cf. Maidhof et al., 2009). SNR 
values were averaged across all electrodes and between-condition 
comparisons were made across subjects.
or manmade using two buttons. Approximately half of the objects 
in each condition were natural. Speed was not emphasized, and 
subjects were instructed to respond based on their first impression 
regarding the category (i.e., that there was “no right answer”). Trial 
order was randomized.
The test phase followed the study phase after a break of approxi-
mately 3  min, during which subjects were given instructions. 
Subjects viewed all 320 objects, each of which belonged to one of 
three conditions: those presented for 250 ms during the study phase 
Figure 1 | Schematic representation of trial types during study and test. 
Conditions during study included Brief (250 ms object presentation) and Long 
(2,000 ms object presentation). Objects in each condition were followed by a 
mask such that trial duration was 2,500 ms for both conditions. Subjects 
categorized each object as “natural” or “manufactured. ” Conditions during test 
included Brief and Long objects repeated from the study phase as well as new 
objects. Objects in all conditions were presented for 500 ms with a 1,500 ms 
mask. Two behavioral responses were registered for each object. The first was 
a categorization response to measure priming, made as soon as possible after 
the stimulus was presented. The second was a recognition response including 
four confidence levels, made to a prompt that followed the mask.Frontiers in Human Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  December 2010  | Volume 4  | Article 227  |  4
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object type]. The positive relationship between encoding duration 
and   recognition was driven by high-confidence hits, which were 
more prevalent for Long objects than for Brief objects [Table 1; 
t(13) = 6.6, p < 0.001], whereas low-confidence hits were registered 
at similar rates [t(13) = 1.8, p = 0.10]. Likewise, high-confidence 
and low-confidence misses were more prevalent for Brief objects 
than for Long objects [t(13) = 4.4, p < 0.001 and t(13) = 3.1, 
p = 0.001, respectively].
Recognition response times were uninformative because they 
were withheld until the recognition prompt (2,500 ms after stimu-
lus onset). Relative to the recognition prompt, response times for 
high- and low-confidence hits were, respectively, 365 and 412 ms for 
Brief objects, 566 and 299 ms for Long objects, and 479 and 415 ms 
for New objects (correct rejections), without no significant pairwise 
differences between any two conditions (p-values >0.22).
In summary, encoding duration had opposite effects on priming 
and recognition: brief encoding led to greater priming and worse 
recognition whereas Long encoding led to less priming and better 
recognition (Figure 2). We therefore sought to characterize ERP 
old/new effects that varied with encoding duration (selective for 
Brief versus Long) in order to identify neural correlates of priming 
and recognition.
erP results
The primary ERP analysis concerns the Brief, Long, and new object 
conditions, treated irrespective of recognition response type (Figure 3). 
SNR measures of ERP data quality for these conditions did not differ 
significantly (mean SNR values = 14.1, 13.8, and 13.7, respectively, 
F(2,26) = 0.06, p = 0.94]. Two ERP effects were evident that differenti-
ated Brief from Long objects: (1) brief ERPs were more negative than 
new ERPs from approximately 200–400 ms at left parieto-occipital 
electrodes, and (2) long ERPs were more positive than new ERPs from 
approximately 400–600 ms at central–parietal electrodes. Another 
ERP effect was evident that was similar for Brief and Long objects: 
(3) brief and long ERPs were both more positive than new ERPs from 
approximately 300–600 ms at bilateral anterior electrodes.
These observations were confirmed using repeated-measures 
ANOVA, which was used to test mean amplitudes for the three 
conditions for the 200–400 ms and 400–600 ms latency intervals 
(which captured the visually evident between-condition differences 
described above) for six electrode clusters (anterior, central, and 
posterior, each on left and right scalp). A three-way interaction 
indicated that differences between conditions varied by latency 
and location [F(3.0,38.6) = 7.6, p < 0.001].
results
BehavIoral results
The magnitude of priming during the test phase was greater for 
objects that were studied for 250 ms (Brief) compared to objects 
studied for 2,000 ms (Long), whereas the opposite pattern was 
identified for recognition. Categorization response times varied 
significantly for Brief, Long, and New objects [F(2,26) = 21.7, 
p < 0.001], and were significantly faster both for Brief objects 
(586 ms, SE = 40 ms) and for Long objects (605 ms, SE = 41 ms) 
compared to new objects [627 ms, SE = 43 ms; t(13) = 5.5, p < 0.001, 
and t(13) = 4.4, p < 0.001, respectively], indicating priming for both 
study durations. Response times for Brief objects were significantly 
faster than the for Long objects [Figure 2A; t(13) = 3.2, p = 0.006], 
indicating greater priming magnitude for Brief objects and, thus, an 
inverse relationship between study duration and priming. Response 
times for Brief and Long objects did not differ reliably during the 
study phase [710 and 713 ms, respectively, t(13) = 0.26, p = 0.80], 
indicating that priming effects on response times during the test 
phase were due to repetition. Accuracy for categorization responses 
was high for Brief, Long, and New objects (91.2, 89.9, and 91.7%, 
respectively) and did not vary by condition (all pairwise p-values 
>0.39), indicating that speed-accuracy tradeoffs did not underlie 
priming effects on categorization response times.
Recognition hit rates collapsed for high- and low-confidence 
responses differed significantly for Brief, Long, and New objects 
[F(2,26) = 395.7, p < 0.001], and hit rates were significantly greater 
for Brief objects (0.75, SE = 0.03) and for Long objects (0.86, 
SE = 0.02) compared to the false-alarm rate for new objects [0.13, 
SE = 0.02; t(13) = 18.1, p < 0.001, and t(13) = 28.2, p < 0.001, 
respectively]. This indicates that subjects successfully discrimi-
nated old objects of both encoding durations from new objects. 
Recognition hits were more prevalent for Long objects than for 
Brief objects [Figure 2B; t(13) = 4.8, p < 0.001], indicating a posi-
tive relationship between encoding duration and recognition. The 
prevalence of high-confidence and low-confidence responses 
also varied for Brief, Long, and New objects [F(6,78) = 134.0, 
p < 0.001, for the interaction of the four confidence levels with 
Table 1 | Mean recognition endorsement rates for high confidence (HC) 
and low confidence (LC) responses.
Stimulus type  response type
  Old HC  Old LC  New LC  New HC
Brief old  0.62 (0.04)  0.13 (0.02)  0.12 (0.02)  0.13 (0.03)
Long old  0.76 (0.03)  0.10 (0.02)  0.08 (0.02)  0.06 (0.02)
New  0.06 (0.02)  0.07 (0.01)  0.27 (0.05)  0.60 (0.05)
Parentheses indicate SE.
Figure 2 | Opposite effects of study duration on priming and 
recognition. (A) The average difference between old and new objects in 
categorization response time during the memory test is shown for Brief and 
Long objects. (B) The average hit rate for the recognition response is shown 
for Brief and Long objects, collapsed across high- and low-confidence levels. 
Error bars indicate SE.Frontiers in Human Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  December 2010  | Volume 4  | Article 227  |  5
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Long objects averaged +0.87 mV for the left cluster (p = 0.007) 
and +0.86 mV for the right cluster (p = 0.03). The Brief and Long 
old/new effects did not differ reliably for either cluster (p = 0.18 
and 0.46, respectively).
A follow-up ANOVA for the 400–600 ms interval yielded a signif-
icant condition-by-region interaction [F(3.2,41.5) = 3.1, p = 0.001], 
and follow-up comparisons for the three conditions were therefore 
performed for each cluster, yielding significant main effects for all 
clusters (p-values <0.01). For left and right anterior clusters, posi-
tive old/new effects were evident for both Brief and Long objects. 
The effects for Brief objects averaged +1.67 mV for the left cluster 
(p = 0.004) and +1.48 mV for the right cluster (p = 0.02), and the 
effects for Long objects averaged +1.52 for the left cluster (p < 0.001) 
and +1.73 for the right cluster (p = 0.001). The magnitude of the 
Brief and Long old/new effects did not differ reliably for either clus-
ter (p = 0.77 and 0.67, respectively). The left and right central and 
A follow-up ANOVA for the 200–400 ms interval yielded a 
significant condition-by-region interaction [F(3.9,51.4) = 16.2, 
p < 0.001], and follow-up comparisons for the three conditions 
were therefore performed for each cluster, yielding significant 
main effects for the left posterior cluster and for the left and right 
anterior clusters (all p-values <0.01; p-values at other clusters 
>0.07). A negative old/new effect for Brief objects was evident 
for the left posterior cluster (−0.93 mV on average, p = 0.01), 
whereas the old/new effect for Long objects for the same cluster 
was positive and of marginal significance (+0.82 mV on average, 
p = 0.07). The old/new effect for Brief objects was significantly 
more negative than for Long objects for the left posterior cluster 
(p < 0.001). For left and right anterior clusters, positive old/new 
effects were evident for both Brief and Long objects. The effects 
for Brief objects averaged +1.39 mV for the left cluster (p = 0.006) 
and +1.22 mV for the right cluster (p = 0.02), and the effects for 
Figure 3 | Distinct erP correlates of priming and recognition. ERP 
waveforms during the memory test for Brief, Long, and new objects are shown 
on the left for the four midline electrodes indicated on the diagram of the head as 
viewed from above (Fz, Cz, Pz, and Iz). Waveforms are timelocked to the onset of 
the objects, and positive deflections are plotted upwards. Topographic 
distributions for old/new ERP differences are shown on the right for Brief and 
Long objects for 200–400 ms and 400–600 ms latency intervals. The magnitude 
of old minus new ERP differences is indicated by the colorscale, with red 
coloration indicating greater positive differences and blue coloration indicating 
greater negative differences. Arrows are used to highlight the ERP old/new effect 
attributed to recognition (upper arrow) and the effect attributed to priming (lower 
arrow). The distinction between ERPs attributed to priming and recognition is also 
apparent in the topographic maps. The upper right topographic map is 
characteristic of the ERP effects attributed to recognition whereas the lower left 
topographic map is characteristic of the ERP effects attributed to priming. A 
similar distinction between Brief and Long old/new effects was evident when 
ERPs were computed using an average scalp reference instead of the average 
mastoid reference used here (Figure A1 of Appendix).Frontiers in Human Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  December 2010  | Volume 4  | Article 227  |  6
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Comparing the 200–400 ms old/new effect for Brief objects to 
the 400–600 ms effect for Long objects yielded a significant con-
dition-by-electrode interaction [F(5.4,70.0) = 10.9, p < 0.001], 
indicating that the topographies differed significantly. Given that 
old/new effects for Long objects appeared similar in topography 
for the 200–400 ms interval as for the 400–600 ms interval (but 
smaller in amplitude, Figure 3), we also tested for topographic 
differences between Brief and Long objects for the 200–400 ms 
interval. Significantly different topographies were indicated by a 
condition-by-electrode interaction [F(5.3,69.1) = 9.9, p < 0.001]. 
The same topographic differences were found when only those 
electrodes included in the clusters used for primary statistical 
assessment were tested [Brief old/new 200–400 ms versus Long 
old/new 400–600 ms interaction F(5.1,66.0) = 11.0, p < 0.001; 
Brief old/new 200–400 ms versus Long old/new 200–400 ms 
interaction F(5.1,66.0) = 8.6, p < 0.001]. These topographic 
assessments therefore suggest that old/new effects for Brief 
objects and for Long objects resulted from activity in different 
neural populations, and this dissociation is consistent with their 
dissociation based on polarity (negative versus positive, respec-
tively) and functional properties (priming versus recognition, 
respectively).
Additional evidence that the early negative ERP effect was due 
to priming was obtained in an analysis that examined memory 
and ERPs as a function of categorization-task response times. This 
analysis was predicated on the assumption that faster categoriza-
tion-task response times were partially due to priming, although 
other influences could potentially have contributed to faster 
response times for a subset of objects (e.g., those with features 
that led to rapid categorization). A within-subjects median split 
on categorization-task response times was used to divide old Brief, 
old Long, and new trials into fastest and slowest categories. The 
relationship between recognition and categorization-task response 
time was investigated by computing recognition accuracy sepa-
rately for the fastest and slowest categories. Recognition responses 
were more accurate for the slowest versus the fastest categorization 
responses for Brief, Long, and new objects (Table 2), indicating 
that recognition and response times on the priming measure were 
inversely related.
posterior clusters exhibited a different pattern of old/new effects, 
whereby positive old/new effects were reliable for Long objects but 
not for Brief objects. For the central left, central right, posterior left, 
and posterior right clusters, the average old/new mV differences 
for Long objects were + 1.96 (p < 0.001), + 2.30 (p < 0.001), + 1.69 
(p < 0.001), and +1.86 (p < 0.001), respectively. The same differences 
for Brief objects were + 1.05 (p = 0.05), + 0.97 (p = 0.10), + 0.83 
(p = 0.11), and +0.64 (p = 0.24), respectively. The old/new ERP 
difference was significantly more positive for Long objects than for 
Brief objects for each of these four clusters (p = 0.03, 0.007, 0.03, 
and 0.004, respectively).
In summary, analyses of the 200–400 ms interval identified a 
negative parieto-occipital effect that was selective for Brief objects, 
whereas analyses of the 400–600 ms interval identified a positive 
central–parietal effect that was selective for Long objects. Because 
Brief and Long objects were differentially associated with prim-
ing and recognition, respectively, the early negative ERP effect can 
be attributed to priming for Brief objects and the later positive 
effect can be attributed to recognition for Long objects. A third 
ERP old/new effect was positive at bilateral anterior electrodes 
and spanned both latency intervals. This effect did not differ for 
Brief and Long objects, and therefore was not selective for priming 
or recognition.
The 200–400 negativity associated with repetition of Brief 
objects appeared to encompass a different spatial extent than 
did the 400–600 ms positivity associated with repetition of Long 
objects. We analyzed topographical differences between the two 
effects in order to test for whether they resulted from activity in 
different neural populations. Confounding influences due to varia-
tions in difference amplitudes across conditions were removed via 
the vector-scaling method with range normalization (McCarthy 
and Wood, 1985; but see Urbach and Kutas, 2002). We adopted a 
conservative approach by including vector-scaled amplitude values 
from all scalp electrodes, rather than using only a subset of elec-
trodes at which the effects were present. This selection thus served 
to bias the analyses against finding topographical differences by 
including the subset of electrodes at which old/new effects were not 
observed, and therefore could not have contributed to topographic 
differences between the two conditions.
Table 2 | Mean recognition endorsement rates for high confidence and low confidence responses computed as a function of response time (rT) on 
the priming measure (in ms).
Stimulus type  Categorization  recognition response type
  rT  Old HC  Old LC  New LC  New HC
Brief old fastest  491 (29)  0.58 (0.01)  0.15 (0.01)  0.13 (0.01)  0.14 (0.01)
Brief old slowest  753 (55)  0.66 (0.01)  0.11 (0.01)  0.10 (0.01)  0.13 (0.01)
Long old fastest  504 (27)  0.73 (0.01)  0.12 (0.01)  0.08 (0.01)  0.07 (0.00)
Long old slowest  772 (63)  0.78 (0.01)  0.09 (0.01)  0.07 (0.00)  0.06 (0.01)
New fastest  511 (35)  0.07 (0.01)  0.08 (0.00)  0.28 (0.01)  0.58 (0.01)
New slowest  816 (58)  0.06 (0.00)  0.06 (0.00)  0.26 (0.01)  0.63 (0.01)
The fastest and slowest categories were defined by median split. Repeated-measures ANOVAs with factors condition and response type were conducted separately 
for Brief, Long, and new objects, and significant condition-by-response type interactions [F(3,39) values = 5.2, 3.3, and 3.1, p-values = 0.004, 0.03, and 0.04, respec-
tively] indicated that recognition was more accurate for the slowest category than the fastest for all stimulus types.Frontiers in Human Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  December 2010  | Volume 4  | Article 227  |  7
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for other clusters). In contrast, no fastest/slowest differences were 
reliable for new objects [condition main effect F(1,13) = 0.15, ns; 
condition-by-cluster F(5,65) = 0.31 ns; p-values >0.49 for pairwise 
comparisons for all clusters]. The fastest/slowest difference for Brief 
objects was significantly more negative than for new objects for 
left central (−1.5 versus +0.2 mV; p = 0.03) and left posterior (−1.5 
versus +0.3 mV; p = 0.008) clusters. Likewise, the fastest/slowest 
difference for Long objects was more negative than for new objects 
for left central (−1.2 versus +0.2 mV; p = 0.07) and left posterior 
(−1.1 versus +0.3 mV; p = 0.06) clusters.
For the 500–700 ms interval, a three-way interaction of study-
duration condition, response-speed condition, and cluster predi-
cated separate assessment of the Brief, Long, and new conditions 
[F(4.5,58.5) = 2.9, p = 0.02]. The fastest category was significantly 
more positive than the slowest category from 500 to 700 ms for Brief, 
Long, and new objects [condition main effect F(1,13)   values = 4.5, 
4.6, and 5.0, p-values = 0.05, 0.05, and 0.04, respectively]. Non-
significant condition-by-cluster interactions (p-values >0.36) indi-
cated that, although the positive fastest/slowest difference appeared 
maximal at mid-central electrodes, the magnitude of the effect did 
not differ reliably across clusters.
The positive fastest/slowest difference from 500 to 700 ms can be 
attributed to preparation of motor output or other non-specific fac-
tors associated with rapid behavioral responding rather than memory 
because it was evident irrespective of whether objects were old or 
Two ERP effects differentiated the fastest and slowest   categories 
(Figure 4): (1) a negative parieto-occipital effect from 200 to 400 ms, 
similar to the effect attributed to priming for Brief objects in the 
primary analyses, was evident for Brief and Long objects but not 
new objects, and (2) a positive central effect from approximately 
500–700 ms was evident for Brief, Long, and new objects. Note that 
SNR measures of ERP data quality did not differ significantly for the 
Brief fastest, Brief slowest, Long fastest, Long slowest, New fastest, 
and New slowest categories (mean SNR values = 10.8, 10.3, 10.2, 
10.1, 10.9, and 10.7, respectively, F(5,65) = 0.27, p = 0.93].
Differences between the fastest and slowest categories from 200 
to 400 ms were assessed separately for Brief, Long, and new objects 
using repeated-measures ANOVA with the six electrode clusters 
used in the primary analysis [a three-way interaction of study-
duration condition, response-speed condition, and cluster predi-
cated separate assessment of the Brief, Long, and new conditions, 
F(3.7,48.4) = 3.3, p = 0.02]. For Brief objects, a condition-by-cluster 
interaction indicated that differences between fastest and slowest 
items varied by location [F(1.6,21.0) = 4.1, p = 0.03]. Follow-up 
pairwise comparisons for each cluster were significant only for 
the left central (p = 0.03) and left posterior (p = 0.04) clusters 
(p-values >0.70 for other clusters). A condition-by-cluster interac-
tion was also observed for Long objects [F(1.5,19.2) = 3.8, p = 0.04], 
and pairwise differences were also reliable only for the left central 
(p = 0.06) and left posterior (p = 0.04) clusters (p-values >0.24 
Figure 4 | Priming erP correlates scale with response times for Brief and 
Long objects. ERP waveforms during the memory test are shown for Brief, 
Long, and new objects, each subdivided into fastest and slowest categories 
based on median split of priming response times. Waveforms are shown for 
the two electrode positions indicated on the diagram of the head (CP3 and Cz). 
Topographic distributions for fastest/slowest ERP differences are shown on the 
right for Brief, Long, and new objects for 200–400 and 500–700 latency 
intervals. Darker colors indicate greater negative differences for 200–400 ms 
and greater positive differences for 500–700 ms, as indicated by the color bars. 
Arrows are used to highlight portions of the ERP waveforms that were 
attributed to priming, which was selective for Brief and Long objects. This 
selectivity is also apparent in the topographic maps for the 200–400 ms 
interval, which show negative left occipitotemporal effects for Brief and Long 
objects only. In contrast, the later-onset positive effect was identified for all 
three object types, and therefore did not reflect repetition-induced memory 
influences on ERPs.Frontiers in Human Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  December 2010  | Volume 4  | Article 227  |  8
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high-confidence recognition and the experience of recollection during 
episodic memory tests, and have been variably termed the “late positive 
old/new effect” or the “late positive complex” (Friedman and Johnson, 
2000; Rugg and Curran, 2007; Voss and Paller, 2008a,b). For instance, 
the magnitude of late positive old/new effects correlate with the 
amount of information retrieved during a recognition test (Wilding, 
2000) and with subjects’ confidence in recognition decisions (Voss and 
Paller, 2009b). These effects might reflect parietal-lobe contributions 
to episodic memory (Wagner et al., 2005; Olson and Berryhill, 2009) 
and/or interactions between parietal cortex and MTL in the service 
of explicit memory (Vincent et al., 2006; Kesner, 2009), although it 
is currently unclear if parietal ERPs are generated by parietal cortical 
activity, parietal–MTL interactions, or activity elsewhere.
The distinction that we identified between early occipitotemporal 
negative repetition effects and later centroparietal positive repetition 
effects is therefore consistent with neural correlates of priming and 
recognition described in the extant literature. Taken together with 
the behavioral finding that study duration had opposite effects on 
priming (greater for shorter durations) than on recognition (greater 
for longer durations), our electrophysiological findings indicate that 
the neural processes that gave rise to priming versus recognition 
were differentially sensitive to study duration, and are consistent with 
findings in amnesic patients that suggest distinct neuroanatomical 
substrates for priming and recognition (Gabrieli, 1998; Squire, 2004). 
By showing that a single manipulation can have opposite effects on 
behavioral and neural correlates of priming and recognition, the cur-
rent results are strongly suggestive of a “double-dissociation” between 
priming and recognition in healthy individuals. It is worth noting 
that the crossover dissociation between priming and recognition we 
observed in the behavioral data do not meet the strict criteria for a 
“reversed association” (Dunn and Kirsner, 1988), and thus do not 
allow us to completely exclude a single-process explanation for the 
data. Nonetheless, the data, both behavioral and neural, are more 
consistent with a double-dissociation between priming and recogni-
tion, and thus provide some of the strongest evidence to date that 
priming and recognition do rely on distinct neural substrates.
One potential limitation of the behavioral paradigm that we 
employed is that the priming judgment always preceded the rec-
ognition judgment during the test, and this contingency could 
have influenced the relationship between priming and recogni-
tion. However, it is important to note that the main behavioral 
  findings – priming increase for Brief versus Long study and recog-
nition increase for Long versus Brief study – have been previously 
elicited when only one type of response or the other was required 
(reviewed in the Introduction). Therefore, it is unlikely that the 
behavioral response requirements that we introduced were alone 
responsible for the behavioral dissociation we identified between 
priming and recognition. Furthermore, it is unclear that reversing 
the order of the recognition and priming responses would yield 
meaningful results, given that subjects would presumably categorize 
objects in the course of making a recognition response, thus inter-
fering with detection of priming on the categorization response. In 
contrast to effects on behavioral correlates of recognition, opposite 
effects of study duration on ERP measures occurred within the first 
second after stimulus onset, before the recognition response was 
made, providing further support for the notion that the order of 
the behavioral response was inconsequential.
new. Furthermore, the ERP effect was opposite to what would have 
been expected if it were due to recognition based on results from the 
primary analyses (Figure 3). In other words, recognition was most 
accurate for the slowest category (Table 2) and ERPs were more nega-
tive for the slowest category compared to the fastest category, whereas 
accurate recognition for Long objects was associated with positive 
ERP effects (Figure 3). In contrast, the early negative fastest/slowest 
difference was memory-related in that it was evident for old (Brief and 
Long) but not new objects and closely resembled the priming effect 
for Brief objects identified in the primary analyses (Figure 3).
dIscussIon
The duration for which objects were studied had opposite behav-
ioral effects on subsequent priming and recognition, and revealed 
distinct electrophysiological responses associated with each kind 
of memory. Objects were studied for either 250 ms (Brief) or 2 s 
(Long), and both priming and recognition were tested for each 
item during a subsequent two-stage memory test. Brief and Long 
items were presented for equivalent durations in the memory test 
(500 ms) along with new objects. The magnitude of priming was 
significantly greater for Brief objects than for Long objects, whereas 
recognition was significantly more accurate and associated with 
higher confidence for Long objects than for Brief objects. Note 
that priming and recognition were significant for both stimulus 
durations, underscoring the fact that these behavioral phenomena 
can occur for many stimulus durations, but that their magnitude 
varies based on manipulations of duration.
Two ERP repetition effects were distinct in time, space, and sign 
(positive versus negative) that paralleled the behavioral effects of 
study duration. An early negative repetition effect at left occipi-
totemporal electrodes was selective for Brief objects, and a later 
positive repetition effect at centroparietal electrodes was selective 
for Long objects. Occipitotemporal negative repetition effects from 
approximately 200–400 span the latencies of several ERP effects 
that are frequently associated with priming, including N/P150 
effects (Dufau et al., 2008; Harris et al., 2009), N250 effects (Dufau 
et al., 2008; Neumann and Schweinberger, 2008), and N350 effects 
(Schendan and Maher, 2009). Zago et al. (2005) found that negative 
repetition effects in fMRI activity were maximal for objects studied 
for 250 ms (Brief) in object-sensitive visual cortex (occipitotempo-
ral cortex and fusiform gyrus) and left inferior prefrontal cortex. 
Negative repetition effects in these structures have been linked 
to priming of perceptual representations (Schacter and Buckner, 
1998a,b; Henson, 2003; Schacter et al., 2007), and might indicate 
repetition-related perceptual learning (Desimone, 1996; Wiggs and 
Martin, 1998; Schacter et al., 2007) similar to what is observed as 
“repetition suppression” phenomena in single unit recordings from 
primate visual cortex (Desimone, 1996). We propose that the early 
negative occipitotemporal effect identified here for Brief objects 
is an electrophysiological correlate of reduced activity in object-
sensitive visual cortex identified previously under comparable cir-
cumstances as a neural correlate of perceptual priming (Zago et al., 
2005), although neurophysiological recordings with higher spatial 
resolution would be required to confirm this interpretation.
Centroparietal positive repetition effects at subsequent latencies, 
similar to those found here from 400 to 600 ms in conjunction with 
recognition of Long objects, have been consistently associated with Frontiers in Human Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  December 2010  | Volume 4  | Article 227  |  9
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The current findings complement those of Schott et al. (2002, 2006) 
who found that different neural events during encoding predicted 
subsequent priming versus recognition, again suggesting different 
neural substrates for the two kinds of memory.
What then is the nature of the relationship between the distinct 
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Despite the fact that study duration had robust effects on 
  behavioral and neural correlates of priming and recognition, 
the precise mechanisms for these effects are currently obscure. 
However, there are several reasonable mechanisms based on the 
known properties of each memory phenomenon. For example, 
Zago et al. (2005) propose that study duration of approximately 
250 ms is ideal for later priming based on the time-varying involve-
ment of neural “sharpening” and “selection” processes that are part 
of widely accepted mechanistic accounts of priming (Desimone, 
1996; Wiggs and Martin, 1998), as explained above. Another pos-
sibility, consistent with transfer-appropriate processing accounts of 
memory (Lockhart, 2002), is that brief study enhances later prim-
ing because both similarly involve rapid stimulus identification. In 
contrast, longer study durations might aid later recognition by pro-
viding time to engage a variety of processes known to aid recogni-
tion memory, such as identifying and encoding the most distinctive 
stimulus features (Gallo et al., 2008), semantically elaborating the 
stimulus (Craik and Lockhart, 1972; Craik and Tulving, 1975), and 
integrating the stimulus with the experimental context (Fabiani and 
Donchin, 1995). Unfortunately, the nature of the duration manipu-
lation complicates analyses of study-time neural mechanisms due to 
the inherent confound of stimulus duration. However, these various 
possibilities could be evaluated by comparing their effects on neural 
processing during retrieval to those of duration.
The current findings add to the substantial literature showing 
that the way in which a stimulus is initially processed has profound 
effects on its retention and retrieval (Craik and Lockhart, 1972; 
Craik and Tulving, 1975; Paller and Wagner, 2002). A general trend 
in previous studies is that more elaborate encoding or more atten-
tion to stimuli during study increases explicit recognition and recall 
but has little or no effect on implicit measures of memory (Schacter 
and McGlynn, 1989; Mulligan, 1998; Rajaram et al., 2001). Implicit 
measures are generally more sensitive to the precise nature of the 
representation initially activated, for example, showing modula-
tions due to unimodal versus multimodal representations of the 
same objects (Murray et al., 2004, 2005; von Kriegstein and Giraud, 
2006). To the best of our knowledge, our findings comprise the first 
evidence that an encoding manipulation can exert opposite effects 
on these two behavioral indices of memory and promote the dif-Frontiers in Human Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  December 2010  | Volume 4  | Article 227  |  10
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Figure A1 | event-related brain potentials were computed using the 
average of all electrodes as the reference, with display format matching 
that in Figure 3. The same general distinction between the Long and Brief 
conditions is evident, with centroparietal positive ERP old/new differences 
selective for Long for 400–600 ms and occipitotemporal negative ERP old/new 
differences selective for Brief from 200 to 400 ms. For the 200–400 ms 
interval, average amplitude values for the Brief, Long, and New conditions 
differed significantly across the six electrode clusters [F(4,52) = 16.6, 
p < 0.001]. Old/new differences were significant only for the Brief condition for 
the left-posterior (p < 0.001) and right-posterior (p < 0.001) clusters. The Brief 
old/new difference for the left-anterior cluster approached significance 
(p = 0.07). Old/new differences at all other clusters for the Brief and Long 
conditions were non-significant (p-values > 0.11). For the 400–600 ms interval, 
the condition-by-cluster interaction was also significant [F(3.2,41.6) = 3.2, 
p = 0.03]. Old/new differences were significant only for the Long condition for 
the left-central (p = 0.002) and right-central (p < 0.001) clusters. Old/new 
differences at all other clusters for the Brief and Long conditions were 
non-significant (p-values > 0.13).
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